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Abstract:
In this paper new approach to calculating power indices is described. The problem com­
plexity class is #P-complete. Constructed algorithm is a mix of ideas of two algorithms: 
Klinz & Woeginger partitioning algorithm and Mann & Shapley generating functions al­
gorithm. Time and space complexities of the algorithm are analysed and compared with 
other known algorithms for the problem. Constructed algorithm has pessimistic time com­
plexity O n2n /2 and pseudopolynomial complexity O nq ,  where  q is quota of the voting 
game. This paper also solves open problem stated in [2] - existence of the algorithm for  
calculating Banzhaf power indices of all players with time complexity lower than O n2 2n/ 2 . 
Not only is the answer positive but this can be done keeping the pseudopolynomial com­
plexity of generating functions algorithm in case weights are integers. New open problems 
are stated.
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1 Introduction
Weighed voting games are mathematical models of voting bodies in which each player 
has certain number of votes. In mathematical model each voter is assigned weight and 
votes for or against a decision. The decision is accepted if sum of weights of players voting 
in favour of decision is greater or equal to fixed quota. 
It can be easily proven that the power of a player in a voting body isn't equal to his 
weight (absolute or relative). Power indices are objective way of assessing the power of a  
player in voting body. Banzhaf power index is one of the most commonly accepted among 
voting power theorists. 
In general, when no assumptions about players weights can be made, calculation of 
Banzhaf indices of players is a difficult task. In this paper effective algorithm for calculating  
Banzhaf power indices is devised. 
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2 Preliminaries
Defs 1 A simple voting game is a pair G=P ,v where:
P={1,2,3 , ... , n} - finite non-empty set of players
v :2P{0,1} - function satisfaying v ∅=0 , v P =1 , S⊆T ⇒ v S v T 
Coalition C⊆P is winning if v C =1 , losing if v C =0
A simple game is proper if ∀C⊆P v C v P ∖C 1
Defs 2 Symbol [q ; w1, w2, ... , wn] represents a simple voting game:
G=P , v  P={1,2,3 , ... , n}
v C ={1 for w C q0 for w C q C⊆P , w C=∑i∈C w i (1)
Such game is called weighted voting game.
Weighted voting game is proper if qwP /2
Defs 3 A player p is critical in coalition C if:
v C =1∧v C ∖{ p}=0  (2)
For player p, we denote the number of coalitions in which p is critical in game G as:
p G =∣{C⊆P : v C =1∧v C ∖{p}=0}∣ (3)
Def. 4 The Banzhaf index of player p in game G is:
 p= pG /∑
i∈P
 iG  (4)
Def. 5 Probabilistic Banzhaf index of player p in game G is:
 p
' = pG /2
n−1  (5)
3 Problem
For a weighted voting game [q ; w1, w2, ... , wn] , we are interested in calculating Banzhaf 
indices of all players. Even if we only want to calculate probabilistic Banzhaf index of the 
biggest player the problem is NP-hard [10].
The problem of calculating Banzhaf indices of players is #P-complete [14]. It means that 
it is as hard as any counting problem in NP (examples: #SAT, Permanent, #HAMILTON 
PATH, the counting problem for the knapsack problem). The counting problem is at least 
as hard as the corresponding NP problem. For example if we could solve #SAT problem, 
we can solve decision SAT problem by asking a question - "is the number of solutions of 
#SAT problem greater than zero?".
4 Known solutions
There are exact  and approximate algorithms for  the problem of calculating Banzhaf 
power index. Here only exact algorithms are considered. The basic naive algorithm enu­
merates  through all  coalitions  and has time complexity On2n and memory complexity
On .
Klinz and Woeginger in [7] presented  algorithm which calculates Banzhaf indices of all  
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players  in  time On2 2n/2=O n22n=O n2 1.41n .  The  probabilistic  Banzhaf  index  of  a 
single player can be calculated in time bounded by On2n /2 . The memory complexity of 
the algorithm is O2n /2 . The idea of the algorithm is to partition the set of players into two 
disjoint subsets, find all possible coalitions inside those subsets, sort coalitions by weights 
and apply technical algorithm developed by Horowitz and Sahni in [6].
Mann and Shapley in [9] developed dynamic programming algorithm based on generat­
ing functions for calculating Shapley-Shubik index of power. Brams and Affuso in [5] modi­
fied  the  algorithm  to  calculate  Banzhaf  index.  The  generating  functions  algorithm  is 
pseudopolynomial. If the numbers in the instance of the problem are small, the algorithm 
behaves as polynomial algorithm. In general, if we allow any input, the algorithm has expo­
nential pessimistic complexity.
Bilbao at all in [4] show generating functions algorithm for calculating Banzhaf power in­
dex for all players in time bounded by O n2 C .  C is the number of non-zero generating 
function coefficients and is equal to the number of distinct sums of weights that can be ob­
tained by forming coalitions. Also C≤min2
n ,∑
i∈P
wi and it's possible to implement the al­
gorithm in a way that C≤min2n , q  .
Uno [17] shows table generating functions implementation with pseudopolynomial com­
plexity O nq for calculating indices of all players. The memory complexity of the algorithm 
is O q .
Owen in [11,12] developed multilinear extension algorithm for voting games. The al­
gorithm is exact and has exponential time complexity. With the use of central limit theorem 
algorithm is the basis of most approximation algorithms.
Matsui in [10] show recursive algorithm enumerating through all minimal winning coali­
tions.  Algorithm  can  calculate  Banzhaf  index  of  single  player  in  time  bounded  by
O n2∣minW∣ , where minW is the family of minimal winning coalitions (coalition is minimal 
if it's every player is critical). The memory complexity of the algorithm is O n2 .
5 Outline of the solution
Algorithm presented in this paper is a mix of two ideas: partitioning approach by Horow­
itz and Sahni [6] and generating functions by Mann and Shapley [9]. The partitioning ap­
proach was adapted for weighted voting games by Klinz and Woeginger [7].
We partition the set of all players into two subsets with ⌈n/2 ⌉ and ⌊n/2 ⌋ players. In each 
of the subsets independently we obtain generating function. Next we remove single player 
from one of the subsets,  dividing generating function adequately.  To solve our original 
problem we modify and use algorithm for technical problem by Horowitz and Sahni [6]. In  
both subsets generating functions have at most 2n/2 non-zero coefficients. Horowitz and 
Sahni approach, for sorted data, allows us to solve original problem in time bounded by
O NM  , where N and M are the numbers of elements in the subsets (in our case num­
ber of non-zero generating function coefficients in both subsets)
Algorithm combines properties of Klinz and Woeginger partitioning algorithm and gener­
ating functions algorithm. For calculating indices of all players, it has pessimistic time com­
plexity O n2n /2 and pseudopolynomial  time complexity O nq ,  where  q is  the  quota of 
weighted voting game. Algorithm has psedopolynomial complexity only if weights are in­
tegers.
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6 Technical problem
After [6,7], we will construct effective algorithm for technical problem:
Input:
x1≤x2≤...≤x M x i≥0∧ x i∈ℤ - M nonnegative integers sorted ascending
y1≤ y2≤...≤ yN y i≥0∧ y i∈ℤ - N nonnegative integers sorted ascending
a1, a2, ... , a M ai≥0∧ai∈ℤ - M nonnegative integers
b1, b2, ... , bN bi≥0∧b i∈ℤ  - N nonnegative integers
L , U∈ℤ L≤U  - integer lower and upper bounds
Problem:
What is the sum of all products a i b j , taken over all indices pairs i,j 1≤i≤M  1≤ j≤N
that satisfy L≤x i y j≤U ? Formally we ask for X:
 X=∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
N
g x i y jai b j
(6)
g :ℤℤ g n={1 L≤n≤U0 else
Theorem 1 Technical problem can be solved in time O(N+M) and memory O(N+M)
Proof We will construct algorithm.
We add to the input data dummy values y0=−∞ and yM1=∞ , which will serve as sen­
tinels. It implies:
∀ i x i y0L≤U ∧ xi yM1U≥L  (7)
For 1≤i≤M we compute the smallest  l=l(i), such that x i y l≥L . From 7 l(i) is properly 
defined  for  each  i.  Since  the  numbers x i and y i are  sorted  ascending,  for  each  i 
l i1≤l i  is satisfied.
l(1) is computed by searching from y j= y N1 to y j= y0 , until x1 y jL is satisfied. Then 
we set l(1)=j+1.
Since l i1≤l i  is  satisfied,  for i1  we  search  for  l(i)  from y j= y l  i−1 to y l= y0 until
x i y jL is satisfied. Then we set l i = j1 .
The number of search steps for calculating l(1) is N+2-l(1). For i1 we start searching 
from l(i-1) and finish on l(i) and thus the number of search steps for l(i) is l i−1−l i 2 . 
The overall number of steps for calculating l(i) for 1≤i≤M is:
N−l 12∑
i=2
M
l i−1−l i2=N−l M 2M=O M N   (8)
Next,  for 1≤i≤M we compute the largest  u=u(i),  such that x i yu≤U .  From  7 u(i) is 
properly defined. For each i it is satisfied that u i1≤u i  . We can compute u(i) values in 
a procedure symmetric to this for l(i).
For any index i we have:
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L≤x i y j≤U⇔ l i ≤ j≤u i   (9)
Next for 0≤m≤M we compute and store the values:
F m =∑
i=1
m
bi  (10)
This can be done in OM  time by adding bm to the sum in each step.
Finally we can find the answer to technical problem.
Since, for a fixed i, the condition L≤x i y j≤U is equivalent to l i ≤ j≤u i  the g  xi y j
function value from 6 is nonzero only if l i ≤ j≤u i  holds. Therefore we can obtain X:
X=∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
N
g x i y ia i b j=∑
i=1
M
∑
j=l  i
u i 
ai b j=∑
i=1
M
ai ∑
j=l i
u i 
b j=∑
i=1
M
a i [F ui −F l i −1]  (11)
Hence by using formerly computed F(m) values, 11 can be calculated in O(M) time.
In the whole algorithm we use additional memory to store the values of F(m), l(i) and u(i) 
, 0≤i ,m≤M . Therefore memory complexity of the algorithm is O(M+N).
Calculating  l(i) and u(i) for 1≤i≤M needs O(M+N) operations. Calculating and storage 
of F values for 0≤m≤M needs O(M) operations. Calculating X value, as in 11, needs O(M) 
operations. Thus the algorithm complexity is O(M+N) which ends the proof.
7 Generating functions
Generating function of a number sequence a0, a1, a2, ... is a formal power series:
G  x=∑
k=0
∞
a k x
k
 (12)
This power series is called formal since we are not interested in it's value for particular x 
and convergence problems. What we are interested in are it's coefficients ak . We encode 
our problem in such a way that the coefficient corresponding xk is equal to the number of 
coalitions, possible to form, with weight equal to k.
Let P ,v  be a voting game represented by [q ; w1, w2, ... , wn] . We will write w for the sum 
of weights of all players,  w=w(P). The biggest coalition (of all players) in the game has 
weight sum w. As a consequence all the terms in the sequence {ak}k≥0 from kw are equal 
to zero. Hence we can write:
G  x=∑
k=0
w
a k x
k  (13)
The generating function G(x) can be obtained by using elementary operations on poly­
nomials.
Theorem 2 Let P ,v =[q ;w1, w2, ... ,wn] be a voting game. The generating function of a 
sequence a0, a1, a2, ... , where ak is equal to the number of coalitions with weight sum k is:
G x=∏
i=1
n
1xw i  (14)
Proof. 
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∏
i=1
n
1 xw i=1 xw11 xw2 ...1 xwn=∑
S⊆P
∏
i∈S
xw i=∑
S⊆P
x
∑
i∈S
w i
=∑
k=0
∞
ak x
k  (15)
The product of the factors on the left side of equation 15 can be seen as the sum taken 
over all possible choices of parentheses. In a single choice we have S from P possible  
parentheses. From the chosen parentheses we multiply corresponding xw i , from those that 
are not chosen we multiply by 1. Then we notice that:
∏
i∈C
xw i=x
∑
i∈C
w i
Summing up such expressions we get a polynomial (since from some k all the terms are 
equal to zero). Choosing parentheses corresponds to choosing players to coalition. Multi­
plication x i x j= x i j corresponds joining coalition with weight sum i and coalition with weight 
sum j. By summing up all the monomials with the same power xk, we count the number of 
coalitions with that sum k.
Let  j  be  a  step  in  multiplying  terms of  14 by 1x w j .  We will  analyse  the  relation 
between coefficients ak
 j  and ak
 j−1  . Since there is only one way to obtain a coalition with 
weights sum zero (the empty coalition),  for  each  j we have a0
 j =1 .  Moreover ak
0 =0 for 
1≤k≤n . When we are multiplying polynomial from step (j-1) in step j, we have:
1a1
 j−1 xa2
 j−1 x2...aw
 j−1 xw 1 xw j  (16)
From multiplying by 1 we get the same polynomial as in step (j-1). By multiplying by xw j
we modify the coefficients ak
 j−1  in the following way: ak
 j =a k
 j−1ak−w j
 j−1   for k≥w j . As a con­
sequence we get recurrence:
ak
 j ={ak j−1 ak−w j j−1  k≥w jak j−1 kw j  (17)
After applying 17 n times, in step j for 0≤k=wP  , we get coefficients ak for 0≤k≤wP 
, equal to the number of coalitions with weights sum k. In the next theorem we will show 
how to calculate coefficients ak in time bounded by the number of players in game and 
number of non-zero generating function coefficients.
Theorem 3 Let C be number of non-zero coefficients in generating function14. The val­
ues of coefficients ak for 0≤k≤w can be calculated in time OnC  and memory OC  .
Proof We will construct algorithm.
We will be putting non-zero GF coefficients on the list along with the power of  x they 
correspond to. First we put on the list a pair (0,1) - the empty coalition can be formed in  
only one way.
By multiplying factors 1xk   in 14, from multiplication by 1 we get the same polynomial 
and from multiplication by xk we get polynomial with coefficients increased by  k. In each 
step we will enumerate through the list with coefficients and corresponding powers of  x. 
On auxiliary list we will be putting elements corresponding to the powers of x increased by 
k.
Since elements on both lists are sorted ascending we can merge lists (it corresponds to 
summing the polynomials), using procedure similar to the one used in classical MergeSort 
algorithm. The only difference is in case the elements on both lists correspond to the same 
power of x. In such case we sum up values of coefficients equal to the number of ways in 
which coalitions can be formed and we put on the output list single element.
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Algorithm 1
Input: voting game [q, w1, w2,...,en]
Output: list with non-zero GF 14 coefficients along with corresponding powers of 
x
ListElement
{
int XPower; //the power of x in monomial from generating function
int Count;  //the a coefficent in monomial from generating function
ListElement Next; //the next element on the list
}
1: List GeneratingFunction(n, [q, w1, w2,...,wn])
2: {
3: List A,B; 
4: A.Push( (0,0) );
5: for(i=0;i<n;i++)
6: {
7: ListElement temp=A.First;
8: while(temp!=A.ListEnd)
9: {
10: B.Push( (temp.XPower+i,temp.Count) ); 
11: temp=temp.Next;
12: }
13: A=Merge(A,B);
14: }
15: return A;
16: }
17: List Merge(A,B)
18: {
19: List R; 
20: R.Push( (0,0) );
21: while( A.NotEmpty() or B.NotEmpty() )
22: {
23: if( A.NotEmpty() and B.NotEmpty() )
24: if(A.First.XPower==R.Last.XPower)
25: R.Last.Count+=A.First.Count; A.RemoveFirst();
26: else if(B.First.XPower==R.Last.XPower)
27: R.Last.Count+=B.First.Count, B.RemoveFirst();
28: else if(A.First()<B.First() )
29: R.Append(A.First), A.RemoveFirst();
30: else
31: R.Append(B.First), B.RemoveFirst(), continue;
32: else if( A.NotEmpty() ) //B is empty
33: if(A.First.XPower==R.Last.XPower)
34: R.Last.Count+=A.First.Count; A.RemoveFirst();
35: R.Append(A), A.Clear();
36: else if( B.NotEmpty() ) //A is empty
37: if(B.First.XPower==R.Last.XPower)
38: R.Last.Count+=B.First.Count; B.RemoveFirst();
39: R.Append(B), B.Clear();
40: }
41: }
Algorithm complexity:
The loop in lines 5-14 will execute  n times. In each step we go through the list with 
length bounded by C (the number of non-zero GF coefficients, defined in 14). The auxiliary 
list has the same amount of elements as list A and thus it's length is also bounded by C. 
The Merge function of classic MergeSort algorithm has complexity O(m+n) where m and n 
are lengths of the merged lists. In our case Merge is O(C), hence the time complexity of 
the whole algorithm is O(nC). As both lists and output list in each step are bounded by C 
we can never keep more than 3C elements on the lists, thus memory complexity is O(C).
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To solve our problem we also need generating function of sequence {ck ,l}k≥0 . We en­
code the problem in such a way, that for a given player l ck ,l corresponds to the number of 
coalitions with weights sum k but without player l.
For a player l, the generating function of {ck ,l}k≥0 can be obtained by dividing the gener­
ating function defined in 14 by 1x wl :
H x =∑
k=0
w
ck ,l x
k=G x / 1x wl=[∏
i=1
n
1xw i] /1 xw l  (18)
It holds:
1c1, l xc2, l x
2...cv ,l x
v1 xw l=1a1 xa2 x
2...aw x
w  (19)
Comparing 19 with 16 we notice that the dependence is the same as in 17, hence:
ak={ck ,lck−w j , l k≥wlck ,l kwl  (20)
By transforming 20 to obtain ck ,l we get:
ck ,l
 j ={ak−ck−w l , l j−1  k≥wlak kwl (21)
21 should be applied from the smallest to the largest k, that is k=0,1 , ... , w . 
 Notation (j) in ck ,l
 j  , means the step incremented along with incrementation of k. 
We will renumerate 21:
ckw l ,l
 j  ={a kw l−ck , l j−1 k≥0akw l k0 (22)
In the next theorem we will show how to calculate ck ,l in time and memory bounded by 
the number or players and non-zero coefficients of generating function.
Theorem 4 Let's assume that we have non-zero ak coefficients of GF defined in 13. Let 
C be the number of those coefficients. The values of coefficients ck ,l for 0≤k≤w and given 
l can be calculated in O C  time and memory.
Proof We will construct algorithm.
Let A be a given list with pairs of coefficients ak and corresponding powers k. We will be 
moving through the list A and putting elements on the auxiliary list B. On the list B we put  
values by which akw l should be decreased according to 22. Upon moving to each ak from 
the list A we will be checking what element lies at the beginning of the list B. In case the 
power of x of element in B is lower than k of ak , we remove that element from B. We keep 
on removing such elements from B until the power of x in the B element is greater or equal  
k of current ak . If the power of x of element in B corresponds to k of ak , we decrease ak
value adequately and remove this element from list B.
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Algorithm 2
Input: list of non-zero GF 14 coefficients along with the powers of x, weight of 
player l
Output: list of GF 18 coefficients(some of them may equal zero)
ListElement
{
int XPower; //the power of x in monomial from GF
int Count;  //coefficent a in monomial from GF
ListElement Next; //next element on the list
}
1: List GFDivide(List A,int w)
2: {
3: List B;
4:
5: ListElement temp=A.First;
6:
7: while(temp!=A.ListEnd)
8: {
9: while(B.NotEmpty() && B.First.XPower<temp.XPower) 
10: B.RemoveFirst();
11:
12: if(B.NotEmpty() && B.First.XPower==temp.XPower) 
13: temp.Count-=B.First.Count, B.RemoveFirst();
14: B.Push( (temp.XPower+w,temp.Count) ); 
15: temp=temp.Next;
16: }
17: B.Clear();
18: return A;
19: }
Algorithm complexity:
There are C elements on list A. Therefore the loop in lines 7-16 executes C times. For 
each element from A we put corresponding element to B. Each element in B is considered 
only once in lines 9-13 and then removed. Thus both time and space complexity of the al ­
gorithm are O(C).
It is worth noting that this algorithm leaves coefficients ck ,l equal to zero on the output 
list if ak was non-zero.
9
8 Main result
According to formula 2, player p is critical in coalition C if:
w C ≥q∧w C −w p≤q−1  (23)
By subtracting player's p weight in inequalities we get interval in which coalition (without 
p) weight sum has to be in order for the player p to be critical.
q−wp≤w C −w p≤q−1  (24)
The classic generating functions algorithm [9], uses inequalities from 24 and generating 
function 18 to calculate the number of critical coalitions for player p. The ck , p coefficients of 
the generating function  18 are equal  to  the number of  coalitions without  player  p with 
weight sum k. Hence, the number of critical coalitions for player p can be calculated as:
p  z = ∑
i=q−w p
q−1
c i , p  (25)
Our approach will be different. We will construct the answer to the problem by partition­
ing the set of players into two subsets. The algorithm is based on the observation de­
scribed in next paragraph.
Let S and T be two disjoint subsets of set of players, S∩T=∅ . Assume that we know 
that inside of subset S the number of coalitions with weights sum x is equal to a and inside 
of set T the number of coalitions with weight sum y is equal to b. Then the number of coali­
tions with weights sum x+y inside set S∪T is equal to ab (perhaps it is also possible to get 
sum x+y by combining other sums of coalitions but it is irrelevant now)
Having generating functions from sets S and T we could answer the question: "What is  
the number of coalitions with sum x+y inside set S∪T ?" We could, for instance, multiply 
the generating functions.
Let z=P , v=[q , w1, w2, ... , wn] be a voting game. We partition the set of players  P into 
two disjoint subsets A and B. Then we remove player p from set A. Let GAx  be a generat­
ing function obtained from set A ∖{p} and GB x from set B.
GAx =∑
i=1
∞
ak x
k
 GB x=∑
i=1
∞
bk x
k
The ak coefficients are equal to the number of coalitions with weights sum k in A ∖{p}
and bk in set B .
The number of critical coalitions for player p could be calculated as:
p  z =∑
i=1
∞
∑
j=1
∞
g i j a i b j  
(26)
g n={1 q−w p≤n≤q−10 else
All the coefficients a i and b j beginning from some i and j are equal to 0. Hence we could 
write the sum above as:
p  z =∑
i=1
w A
∑
j=1
w B 
g i j a ib j  (27)
Notice that 27 is the answer to our technical problem from section 6 (compare 27 with 
6). We will construct algorithm based on those observations.
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Algorithm:
Let D=P ,v=[q , w1, w2, ... ,wn]
1. We partition the set of players P into two subsets A i B with the following cardinalities:
∣A∣=⌈ ∣P∣
2
⌉ and ∣B∣=⌊
∣P∣
2
⌋  (28)
2. We obtain generating functions GAx  and GBx  using algorithm 1 for voting games:
DA=A , v =[q ,w1, w2,... ,w∣A∣] and DB=B ,v =[q ,w∣A∣1 ,w∣A∣2 , ... ,wn] (29)
Let K A and K B be the lists of generating function coefficients obtained from A and B.
3. We will calculate the number of coalitions with critical player p from set A. The case 
when player p is from set B is symmetric. We divide generating function GAx  by 1x wp
using algorithm 2 for a copy of list K A and w=wp . Let K C be the resulting coefficients list.
Let  be the length of list K C and it's content be:
 k 1, ak1 ,k 2, ak2 , ... ,k  , ak  
, where a0 x
0 from the generating function corresponds to k 1, ak1 and the following ele­
ments from the list correspond to following monomials of generating function.
Let  be the length of list K B and it's content be:
  l1, b l1 ,l 2, bl 2 , ... ,l , bl  
, where following elements from the list correspond to non-zero monomials of generat­
ing function GBx  .
4. We solve the technical problem from section 6 using input:
Technical problem notation Supplied data
M 
N 
x1, x2, ... , x M  k 1, k 2, ... , k
 y1, y2, ... , y M  l1, l 2, ... ,l 
a1, a2, ... , aM  ak1 , ak2 ,... , ak
b1, b2,... , bN  bl 1 , bl 2 , ... ,b l
L q−wp
U q−1
 X=∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
N
g xi y jai b j= pD
g :ℤℤ g n={1 L≤n≤U0 else
The solution of technical problem is the number of coalitions with critical player p. We 
repeat steps 3-4 for all the players obtaining the number of coalitions with particular play­
ers critical.
The Banzhaf indices of players can be calculated using formula 4:
 p= pG /∑
i∈P
 iG 
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Complexity analysis:
1 can be done in O(n) time.
From theorem 3, 2 may be done in O nn  time, where  is the number of generat­
ing function GAx  coefficients and  the number of GB x coefficients. Sets A and B have 
at most n/2 players, thus generating functions GAx  and GB x have at most 2n/2 non-zero 
coefficients (in pessimistic case each of 2n/2 coalitions has distinct weights sum). As a con­
sequence 2 can be done in On2n /2 time.
3 and 4 are executed for each player, hence n times. Let p be a player from set A. The 
case when p is from set B is symmetrical.
According  to  theorem  4,  the  generating  function GAx  can  be  divided  by 1x wp in
O time.  The resulting  generating  function GC x  has at  most  non-zero  coefficients. 
Thus 3 can be done in O2n /2 .
According to theorem 1 the technical problem can be solved in O(N+M) time, where N 
and M are the numbers of coefficients x i and y i .  As a consequence  4  can be done in
O time,  where  , are  the  numbers  of  non-zero  generating  functions GAx  and
GB x coefficients. Hence 4 can be done in O 2n /22n/2=O 2∗2n /2=O2n /2 time.
Since 3 and 4 are executed n times the time complexity of this part of the algorithm is
Onn  . This can be also written as On 2n /2 .
As a consequence the whole algorithm for calculating indices of all players has time 
complexity of Onn =O n2n /2 .
It is worth noting that  ,  , the numbers of non-zero generating functions coefficients, 
which are equal to the number of distinct weights sums among coalitions, may be limited 
by quota q of the game. The player can't be critical in a coalition if it's weights sum without  
him is already greater or equal q. Hence the time complexity of the whole algorithm, after 
little modification, could be also written as O nq . Thus the algorithm keeps the pseudo­
polynomial time complexity of generating functions algorithm and unlike it has pessimistic 
time complexity O n2n /2 .
The algorithm described in this section is quite basic. It can be further improved. Those 
modifications don't change it's pessimistic computational complexity but reduce the num­
ber of operations during computations.
Modifications:
1. In point 3, when we divide generating functions, the zero GF coefficients can be re­
moved from the list as they appear. See also modification 2.
2. If we don't remove zero GF coefficients in point 3, the tables with u=u(j) in technical 
problem are equal for all players from the sets A and B. It is sufficient to calculate u 
values only twice: for the first player in set A and first player in set B. 
3. If we don't remove zero GF coefficients in point 3 the F function in technical problem 
(see formula 10) may be calculated only twice: for the list K A and K B . This modifica­
tion with modification 2 is probably better optimization than modification 1.
4. In all cases when we are computing generating functions the coefficients corres­
ponding to weight sums greater than quota q may be omitted. 
5. If some players share the same weight it's sufficient to calculate number of critical 
coalitions for one of them and use this value for all of them.
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9 Comparison with other algorithms
Algorithm Pessimistic complexity
Psuedopol
ynomial 
complexity
Complexity 
expressed most 
accurately
Memory 
complexity
Data
(type)
M
V
G
Notes Info
Direct 
Enumeration n2
n - n2n n any Y naive algorithm -
Klinz & 
Woeginger 
"Partitioning"
n22n /2 - n22n /2 2n/2 any* N
*int in [7]
other data types 
possible
[7]
Generating 
Functions,"table 
implementation"
nq nq nq q int Y
possible even
q2n
[1,3,4,
5,6,7,
17]
Generating 
Functions, "list 
implementation"
On2n O nq nC 
C 
O 2n
int Y
C - number of non-
zero GF coefs. akxk , 
k<q
 C≤q
the complexity in 
literature is O(n*n*q) 
but can be 
implemented as 
here with O(nq)
[1,3,4,
5,8,9,
17], 
here
Matsui 
Enumeration ? ? O n
2∣minW∣ O n2 ? ?
minW is family of 
minimal winning 
coalitions
[10]
Generating 
Functions 
"Partitioning"
(algorithm from 
this paper)
On2n /2 Onq nC1nC2
C1C2
O2n /2
int N
P=A∪B
A∩B=∅
C1, C2  - 
number of non-
zero GF coeffs. 
from A and B, akxk 
for k<q
C1C2≤2C
here
Table 1: The comparison of properties of exact algorithms for voting games. Optimized  
implementations are compared. Symbol n denotes number of players(problem size), q is the quota
In table 1 we compare the complexities in case of calculating indices for all players. Op­
timized implementations are compared. For instance, in case of generating functions only 
coefficients corresponding to coalitions with weights sums lower than quota q are com­
puted.
The  pessimistic  computational  complexity  is  classic  computational  complexity  ex­
pressed as a function of problem size. In our case this is the number of players.
The pseudopolynomial  complexity  is  the  polynomial  complexity  of  the  algorithm ex­
pressed as a function of problem size and the size of some number present in the instance 
of the problem. It is worth noting that numbers in the problem instance may exceed 2n .
Complexity expressed most accurately is complexity expressed as a function of problem 
size and some value that isn't defined explicitly in the instance of the problem. This com­
plexity expresses the number of operations made in algorithm better than other columns.
Memory complexity is classical memory complexity of the algorithm. If two formulas are 
supplied, it means that one of them assesses complexity more accurately, however calcu­
lating it may be not possible before solving the instance of the problem. The second value 
is a direct function of the problem size and thus is easy to determine.
Data type tells whether the algorithm is applicable for types other than integers.
MVG tells  if  the approach in algorithm can be adapted for multiple weighted voting 
games. In such case complexities may differ.
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10 Genral case (non-integer weights)
In case weights are not integers the algorithm can be used almost without modification. 
The algorithm no longer has pseudopolynomial complexity. The number of distinct sums of  
weights of coalitions no longer can be bounded by sum of all players weights (or quota).  
Thus the algorithm has pessimistic  complexity On2n /2 ,  which is  a  slight  improvement 
over Klinz and Woeginger O n2 2n/2 for calculating Banzhaf indices of all players. Non-in­
teger version of the algorithm can only be used with list implementation of generating func­
tions algorithm (as is described in this paper).
11 Further research, open problems and conclusion
In this paper algorithm for calculating Banzhaf indices for all players was designed. Al ­
gorithm has pessimistic time complexity O n2n /2 and therefore is positive answer to the 
open problem stated in [2] - the existence of algorithm for calculating exactly Banzhaf in­
dices of all players in time less than O n2 2n/2 . In case weights are integers, devised al­
gorithm also shares the property of generating functions algorithm - it has pseudopolyno­
mial time complexity O nq . 
Constructed algorithm can be modified to calculate Shapley-Shubik power index (ap­
proach from [7] can be mixed with generating functions of two variables similarly as in this 
paper). 
The new open problem is to devise algorithm to calculate exactly Banzhaf indices of all  
players with time complexity lower than O n2n /2 .  It  would be most valuable if  such al­
gorithm could also keep the pseudopolynomial complexity in case weights are integers.
It seems that approaches from [7] and this paper cannot be used for multiple weighted 
voting games. Another challenging open problem is to devise algorithm that calculates 
Banzhaf indices of all players in multiple weighted voting game with pessimistic time com­
plexity lower than O n2n . 
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